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SUMMARY2
This policy brief is based on the findings of a study undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Hu-
manitarian Demining (GICHD) in 2011-12 on the role of mine action organisations in supporting armed
violence reduction at an operational level. This policy brief examines the increasing involvement of mine
action organisations in efforts to reduce armed violence and promote public safety. It looks briefly at how
the focus on AVR has developed and the types of programmes that mine action organisations are implemen-
ting, as well as the rationale for this shift from ‘traditional’ mine action to AVR. It concludes with a summary
of key findings and lessons learnt. 
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Mine Action Support for
Armed Violence Reduction: 
Mission Creep or Responding to
Wider Security Needs?
NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY
Although there is no international consensus on the
definition of armed violence, this policy brief uses the
definition put forward by the Geneva Declaration on
Armed Violence and Development, which defines
armed violence as the “intentional use of illegitimate
force (actual or threatened) with arms or explosives
against a person, group, community, or state, which un-
dermines people-centred security and/or sustainable
development.”1
Under this definition, armed violence reduction (AVR)
refers to any action or activity that contributes to a de-
crease in armed violence. These may include, among
others: certain peace building activities; disarmament, 
demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes;
community safety programmes; small-arms/light
weapons (SALW) and ammunition disposal; physical
security and stockpile management (PSSM); and secu-
rity sector/system reform (SSR). While some of these
activities are strictly dedicated to reducing armed vio-
lence, others, such as SALW control, ammunition dis-
posal and PSSM, also contribute to increased public
safety and accident prevention (eg, depot explosions).
For the purpose of this policy brief, the terms ‘AVR’ and
‘AVR-related’ will refer to both strict armed violence
reduction as well as wider public safety interventions.
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, a study undertaken by the GICHD found that there were few
examples of existing synergies between SALW programmes and mine action.
However, the study noted that there was scope for using mine action technical
expertise “…to manage the explosive threat through mines/ERW (Explosive
Remnants of War) clearance, SALW collection, and ammunition stockpile
reduction, including by destruction and demilitarisation.”3
The purpose of this policy brief is to illustrate how an increasing number of
mine action organisations are using their mine action technical expertise and
their capacities to operate in difficult environments to reduce armed violence
and promote public safety. Several organisations now have AVR-related
policies, programmes and staff in place. For example:
>    Danish Demining Group (DDG) has developed an AVR framework4
      and is implementing community safety programmes in Somaliland, South 
      Sudan, Uganda and Yemen
>    Mines Advisory Group (MAG) uses the term AVR5 to describe its work 
      on identifying stockpiles and ammunition, stockpile assistance and safe 
      storage, destruction of surplus and obsolete weapons and ammunition, 
      and marking and tracing weapons
>    Several organisations are implementing Physical Security and Stockpile 
      Management programmes (eg, DDG, Swiss Demining Foundation (FSD),
      HALO Trust, MAG, Organisation of American States (OAS), United 
      Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)) to improve the security of arm-
      ouries and storage depots, strengthen ammunition management capacity, 
      reduce the risks of unplanned explosions and prevent theft from stockpiles
>    Action On Armed Violence6 (AOAV) is implementing a reintegration 
     training programme in Liberia for ex-combatants, and HALO Trust 
     employs and trains ex-combatants as deminers in Afghanistan, both of 
      which support broader DDR efforts
>    In addition to mine risk education, Handicap International (HI), Dan-
      ChurchAid and DDG also deliver SALW risk education to prevent SALW-
      related accidents, raise awareness and reduce the impact of  SALW misuse
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Despite the expanding number and scope of these
interventions, limited information is available on
programme objectives, methodologies and results
achieved. While research has been done on the role
of mine/ERW operators beyond mine action, this
research has largely focused on peace-building.
Furthermore, virtually no guidance has been develo-
ped for mine action organisations on how to implement
and support programmes that try to reduce armed
violence and improve public safety. 
To address this gap, the GICHD study7 consisted
of a series of case studies (see Box 1) that profiled
different organisations, highlighting programme
scope, methodology and results, and the rationale
behind the expansion beyond mine action into AVR.
The overall goal of the case studies and this policy
brief is to share key lessons learnt, provide practical
guidance for the mine action community, and streng-
then collaboration between mine action organisations
and those focussing specifically on AVR-related
programmes.
Before examining the different types of AVR-related
programmes that mine action organisations are im-
plementing and the factors which have motivated
this shift to AVR, the following section provides
some background on how discussions on armed
violence reduction have evolved.
FROM SALW CONTROL TO AVR:
THE EVOLUTION 
Increased international attention and policy dialogue
on the need to reduce armed violence stem from
international efforts to address the illicit trade and
proliferation of SALW. Initially, SALW control pro-
grammes focused on reducing the availability or
supply of SALW. However, second generation SALW
programming has moved beyond a focus on supply
to also address the factors stimulating the demand
for arms, including poverty and lack of develop-
ment. In 2006, for example, the Small Arms Survey
published a paper entitled “Demanding Attention:
Addressing the Dynamics of Small Arms Demand,”
which argued that interventions to restrict the sup-
ply of weapons would only succeed if factors driving
demand are carefully diagnosed and acted upon.”8
The AVR approach brings further evolution by
including analysis of how arms are integrated in a
community’s socio-economic, cultural and political
dynamics and looking at links from local through to
regional and international levels.9 Many governmen-
tal, intergovernmental and non-governmental orga-
nisations (NGOs) have since launched initiatives to
ensure AVR efforts are linked to national and regional
development programmes and strategies. Currently,
100 countries have endorsed the Geneva Declaration
on Armed Violence and Development, which is a
high-level diplomatic initiative designed to encourage
states and civil society actors to achieve measurable
reductions in the global burden of armed violence
in conflict and non-conflict settings by 2015 (and
beyond). See Box 2 for a summary of milestones in
the evolution towards the current international AVR
agenda.
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Box 1 | List of case studies 
The GICHD Mine Action and AVR study included the fol-
lowing twelve country case studies:
>    Albania Mine and Munitions Coordination Ofﬁce’s 
      and DanChurchAid’s UXO hotspot clearance project 
      in Albania
>    AOAV’s post-conflict rehabilitation and reintegration 
      programme in Liberia
>    DanChurchAid’s SALW awareness raising project in 
      Burundi
>    DDG’s Community Safety Programmes in Somaliland 
      and Uganda 
>    HALO Trust’s reintegration of former combatants into 
      demining in Afghanistan
>    HI’s SALW risk awareness project in Libya
>    MAG’s PSSM programmes in Burundi and Somaliland
>    OAS’s SALW and munitions destruction programme 
      in Guatemala
>    UNMAS’s PSSM project in Côte d’Ivoire
>    UNMAS’s rapid response project in Congo-Brazzaville
The OECD, at the forefront of promoting a greater
understanding of the links between armed violence
and development, has developed a variety of tools and
methods to aid practitioners in developing effective
AVR programmes. One of these tools is the AVR
lens, an analytical framework that captures the key
elements and levels of armed violence, namely the:
>    people affected by armed violence (victims and 
      wider communities)13
>    perpetrators of armed violence, and their motives14
>    instruments of armed violence15, in particular 
      their availability and supply
>    wider institutional and cultural environment that
      may enable or protect against armed violence16
A diverse range of organisations are implementing
AVR-related initiatives in different programming
contexts (eg high rates of urban criminal violence
to protracted post-conflict insecurity) that focus on
different aspects of the ‘AVR lens’. These include
UN agencies such as the UNDP Bureau for Crisis
Prevention and Recovery and the World Health
Organisation’s Violence and Injury Prevention pro-
gramme, as well as numerous governmental and
non-governmental organisations working at regional,
national and sub-national levels. In some countries
however, these initiatives may not be referred to using
the AVR label.17
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Box 2 | Key AVR milestones 
2001 | The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in SALW is established,
requiring participating steps to enact measures to fight
illicit SALW manufacturing and trade in a broad range
of areas.
2005 | During the World Summit (High Level Plenary
Meeting of the 60th Session of the General Assembly),
global leaders recognise the strong link between develop-
ment, peace, security and human rights.10
2006 | The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and
Development is adopted by 42 states. Now endorsed by
over 100 states, it recognises clear links between armed
violence and development.
2009 | The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee
(DAC) publishes a report titled Armed Violence Reduction:
Enabling Development, which introduces the ‘AVR lens’. 
2010 | The Norwegian Government and the UNDP orga-
nise the Oslo Conference on Armed Violence -Achieving
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), to “generate
international momentum to ensure that commitments to
armed violence reduction and prevention are included in
the High Level Plenary Meeting on the MDGs, and reflected
in subsequent MDG and developmental strategies through
to 2015.”11 More than 60 countries agree to measures to
address armed violence.12
2012 | Global civil society alliance for AVR is established
to promote innovative and evidence-based strategies to
create effective national action plans and programmes
that reduce armed violence.
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A distinguishing element of the AVR lens is its
emphasis on risk factors which exist and interact
at different levels, from local to global, and that it
“…encourages practitioners to think outside of
particular programming mandates and consider the
entirety of the problem at hand.”18 This policy brief
will use the AVR lens as a basis for analysing the
AVR-related programmes being implemented by
mine action organisations.
THE ROLE OF MINE ACTION  
Instruments of armed violence
The majority of mine/ERW operators involved in
AVR have focused primarily on a single element of
the AVR lens—the instruments of violence. This is
not particularly surprising given that they have long
worked on the removal and destruction of other
instruments of violence, ie mines and other ERW.
Mine action organisations are also used to working
with security actors such as the military and police
and, due to their ability to operate in challenging en-
vironments, they are often among the only organi-
sations capable of safely collecting and disposing of
these items. 
Several mine action organisations have established
dedicated, stand-alone SALW and munitions des-
truction programmes, including in those countries
where they have not previously been involved in
mine action. MAG, for example, launched a PSSM
programme in Burundi in 2009, working first with
the police and then with the military to survey wea-
pons and munitions stockpiles, collect and destroy
volatile or surplus SALW and ammunition, refurbish
armouries and train armourers.19 Similarly, UNMAS
was requested by the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire
to provide assistance to the military, gendarmerie20
and the police with securing the numerous storage
depots and armouries that had been looted and
destroyed during the conflict in 2010-11, and with
strengthening ammunition management capacity.
UNMAS contracted HALO Trust to implement the
project.21 Neither had previously worked in Côte
d’Ivoire, which does not have a mine/ERW conta-
mination problem and, as a result, there had been
no previous mine action involvement. 
SALW and munitions collection and destruction, as
well as PSSM programmes, have developed into dis-
tinct categories of operations for several organisations,
signalling a clear broadening of their mandates and
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Figure 1 | The OECD’s AVR Lens
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Source: OECD | Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development | 2009
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objectives. These programmes seek to reduce the risk of unplanned explo-
sions at munitions sites, prevent loss and theft from SALW and munitions
stockpiles, and reduce the number of SALW in circulation. UNMAS, for
example, played a lead role in coordinating the emergency response to the
ammunition depot explosions that took place in Congo-Brazzaville in March
2012.  This was the first time that UNMAS had led an emergency response
to an ammunition depot explosion. Although UNMAS had no prior mine
action involvement in the Republic of Congo, it was able, at short notice, to
deploy personnel to Brazzaville. Several mine/ERW operators have been
involved in the clearance operations, eg, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
(MSB), Demeter and MAG.
Some programmes also try to strengthen the capacity of national authorities,
such as the national military and police, to safely handle, manage and store
their stockpiles. The OAS, for example, had worked in Guatemala on mine
action. Although Guatemala closed its mine action programme in 2005 after
completing its clearance obligations under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban
Convention, the military contacted the OAS several years later to assist with
the disposal of unstable white phosphorous munitions. Based on its contacts
within the military and its reputation in mine action, the OAS has been able
to use this initial request for assistance as the basis for building a wider SALW
and munitions destruction programme with the military in Guatemala.22
However, dealing with the instruments of violence, although necessary, is
only one of the elements identified in the AVR lens as essential for effectively
addressing the problem of armed violence. In recognition of this, some mine/
ERW operators have begun to move beyond a sole focus on the instruments
of violence, to also address the other elements of the AVR lens, ie perpetrators
of armed violence, those affected by it, and formal institutions. 
Beyond the instruments
Several mine action organisations have moved beyond a focus on the instru-
ments of armed violence to implement innovative programmes, some of
which have little to do with mine action, munitions or even SALW control.
AOAV, for example, began its activities in Liberia in 2006 with a Weapons
and Ammunition Disposal (WAD) programme. However, in January 2008,
the organisation significantly broadened its mandate in the country by
launching a training and reintegration programme.23 The programme is for
(i) male and female ex-combatants excluded from Liberia’s Disarmament,
Demobilisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) process and (ii)
male and female war-affected youth engaged in illegal and criminal activities,
or at high risk of re-engaging in conflict. The programme therefore targets
the perpetrators of armed violence, ie ex-combatants and at risk youth, by
providing them with the means to pursue alternative, non-violent livelihoods
through targeted vocational training, psychosocial counselling and sustained
reintegration support. And although the training and reintegration programme
was initially implemented alongside its WAD programme, it has become
AOAV’s only programme in Liberia.
HALO Trust in Afghanistan has adopted a slightly different approach.
HALO Trust is employing former combatants and training them as commu-
nity-based deminers in coordination with the Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Programme.24 While the overall objective of HALO Trust’s
clearance programme is to remove the threat of mines/ERW, the strategy of
employing ex-combatants as deminers also contributes to wider efforts to
promote peace and stability by providing them with alternate livelihood op-
portunities. Reintegrees receive a salary from day one of demining training,
which immediately relieves the financial pressure to return to conflict. Ac-
cording to HALO Trust, the retention rate of reintegrees within the demi-
ning sector is 70 per cent, indicating that the programme is helping to change
the behaviour of perpetrators of armed violence. 
Other organisations have also tried to address multiple elements of the AVR
lens in an integrated way. Since 2008 for example, DDG has been imple-
menting Community Safety Programmes (CSP) in Somaliland25, South Sudan
and Uganda26. Although DDG initially intervened in each of these countries
to conduct mine/ERW clearance, the organisation has expanded its mandate
to tackle the threat posed by armed violence. In Somaliland, DDG comple-
tely phased out its demining operations and is focusing solely on community
safety by facilitating the development of community safety plans27, delivering
firearms safety education along with conflict management training28, and
installing safe-storage devices29 for firearms to reduce the risks associated
with unsafe storage of SALW and misuse. In Uganda, DDG facilitates peace
meetings between different clans, as well as regular meetings between com-
munities and their security providers, and is also delivering conflict mana-
gement education to the police and the military. DDG’s approach goes
beyond trying to secure access to or prevent the proliferation of arms and
ammunition, to also try to change attitudes and behaviour, and strengthen
local institutions and community capacity and resilience. Also of note is the
fact that DDG is trying to strengthen programming synergies with its parent
organisation, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), in an effort to enhance
the impact of combined community safety and development programming.
DRC focuses on a range of sectors, including housing and small-scale infra-
structure, income generation, social rehabilitation and food security and
agricultural rehabilitation and development.
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While each of DDG’s three Community Safety
Programmes has been developed according to local
context and needs, they share some similarities. For
example, the programmes:
>    are informed by DDG’s AVR framework
>    are community-driven with a strong emphasis 
      on community capacity-building
>    include a range of activities that target: the 
      instruments of violence, eg safe storage devices 
      for SALW and ERW collection and destruction;
      perpetrators of violence, eg providing conflict 
     management training and facilitating peace 
      meetings; and institutions, eg establishment of 
      community and district-level committees dealing 
      with community safety issues
HI is also moving in a similar direction. It began its
work in Libya in April 2011 with an emergency
response project focused on clearing mine/ERW
contamination resulting from the country’s civil
conflict.30 However, the rapidly increasing number
of deaths and injuries resulting from the uncontrolled
proliferation and misuse of SALW in Benghazi led 
HI to expand its project. HI’s intervention, initially
restricted to eastern Libya, focuses on changing
civilian behaviour by increasing public awareness
of the risks posed by SALW. HI’s risk awareness
project consists of delivering SALW Risk Education
(RE) sessions, similar in approach to Mine Risk
Education, and using the media to publicise SALW
risk messages. By seeking to change how people view
SALW, HI is tackling both the perpetrators of armed
violence as well as those affected. With the expansion
of its project to Tripoli in 2012, HI is also moving
towards a community safety approach by engaging
directly with the authorities and civil society to en-
sure an institutional shift aimed at deterring civilian
SALW ownership. In these ways, HI has opted for 
a more integrated intervention that addresses mul-
tiple elements of the AVR lens. 
Both DDG and HI’s community safety programmes
draw upon community safety interventions implemen-
ted by organisations such as the South Eastern and
Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of
Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), Safer-
world, UNDP and national NGOs in the Balkans.
For example, Handicap International noted that its
SALW RE training materials were developed based
on materials produced by SEESAC and the Bonn
International Center for Conversion’s (BICC) Training
and Education on Small Arms (TRESA) modules. 
Despite differences in their programmes, objectives
and methods, this subset of broader AVR pro-
grammes share one central characteristic: a people
centred-approach. The concerns and perceptions of
the victims and local communities affected by armed
violence—the ultimate beneficiaries—figure as a
key element in the design and implementation of
these programmes. Communities are not only sur-
veyed and consulted, but are often integrally involved 
in the programmes themselves. Invariably, the level
of community involvement in a programme depends
on the operator’s methodology, but the close invol-
vement of communities represents an important step
towards ensuring these programmes are needs-based,
effective and sustainable.
These examples illustrate the expanded scope and
involvement of mine action organisations in AVR.
They should however be viewed as one element of
the AVR lens which complement the interventions
of a wide range of other actors involved in reducing
armed violence. The reasons behind this shift are
varied, and are examined in greater detail in the fol-
lowing section.
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MINE ACTION TO AVR: REASONS FOR THE EXPANSION 
GICHD’s study of mine action organisations that have ventured into the
realm of AVR revealed several motivating factors. The shift partly reflects
the fact that while 1,155 people were killed by mines and other ERW in 201031,
approximately 740,000 people die annually as a result of armed violence, in-
cluding in non-conflict affected countries.32 DDG Somaliland, for example,
shifted from demining to community safety partly in response to a survey of
several communities identified as high and medium mine/ERW impacted,
which found that mines were not having as serious an impact on communities
as previously believed, whereas SALW and private ownership of ERW were
resulting in far more deaths and injuries.33
Mine action organisations are able to work in unstable, conflict-affected
contexts such as Afghanistan, Somalia and South Sudan, due to their
experience in responding to emergency mine/ERW contamination threats
during and immediately after conflicts. They are also used to adhering to
International Mine Action Standards and to undertaking quality control and
quality assurance for their mine action operations. This type of experience
and logistical expertise makes them well-placed to also respond to threats
related to SALW and munitions. 
Another factor motivating this shift is the possibility that the generous fun-
ding previously made available for mine action will decrease beyond 2015.34
Mine action organisations are therefore expanding the range of services that
they provide to address a wider range of threats and make use of new funding
opportunities.
Progress on the legal, normative and diplomatic fronts (see Annex 1) has
also helped present operators with a framework within which to provide
affected states with AVR assistance. Regarding SALW control, examples
include the UN Programme of Action on SALW, the International Ammu-
nition Technical Guidelines, the International Small Arms Control Standards,
and regional initiatives such as the Nairobi Protocol and the Economic Com-
munity Of West African States (ECOWAS) Convention. On the AVR front,
the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, the Oslo
Commitments on Armed Violence and civil society efforts to establish a
global alliance on AVR have also focused international attention on the
problem of armed violence.   
A final factor motivating this shift is that operators have received requests
for AVR-related assistance from contacts in the security forces in countries
where they previously worked. These relationships have, in some cases, helped
facilitate engagement in new areas, eg PSSM and SALW and munitions
destruction. For example, MAG’s PSSM programme in Somaliland evolved
based on a request from the national authorities.35 In 2008, MAG had
provided support and other expertise for the collection and destruction of
SALW. However, in 2010, the Police Commissioner in Somaliland’s capital,
Hargeisa, asked MAG to visit one of its main police armouries due to
concerns about the poor storage conditions of arms, ammunition and explo-
sives, and the potential risks posed to police officers and civilians. Based on
this request, MAG conducted a survey of over 40 police armouries across
Somaliland, and used the findings to develop a multi-phased PSSM project
that began in mid-2011.
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GICHD STUDY ON MINE ACTION AND AVR:
SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS
LEARNT
The GICHD’s research focused on documenting
examples where traditional mine/ERW operators
had expanded into AVR or public safety-related
programming. Based on an analysis of twelve pro-
grammes, the following are the main findings and
lessons learnt to date:
1.   Most of the mine/ERW operators are concen-
     trating on the instruments of violence: Most 
      of the operators involved in AVR-related pro-
      grammes have opted to focus on one aspect of 
      the AVR lens, ie the instruments of violence. 
      Their programmes include collecting and des-
      troying excess and unsafe SALW and ammunition,
      promoting the physical security of arms and am-
      munition stores and raising awareness about the 
      risks of SALW. This reflects in part that mine 
      action organisations are used to dealing with 
      mines/ERW and have been able to also develop 
      programmes to tackle SALW and munitions as 
      a natural extension.
2.   Some operators are charting new territory: A 
      few operators have, however, focused their in-
      terventions on different elements of the AVR 
      lens, such as the perpetrators of violence and 
      institutions, with a strong community focus. In 
      doing so, these operators are demonstrating that 
      they have the capacity to innovate and chart 
      new territory. DDG’s Community Safety 
      Programme approach and AOAV’s Post-Conflict
      Rehabilitation and Reintegration Training project
      in Liberia are clear examples of programmes 
      which are well beyond the scope of mine action. 
      These programmes recognise that reducing armed
      violence requires changing behaviour and attitudes,
      and they try to address some of the factors driving
      armed violence, eg weak governance, limited 
      capacity and lack of livelihood opportunities. 
      Community involvement was cited by several 
      organisations as vital to relevance and to sustai-
      nable behaviour change. 
3.    National mine action authorities remain focused
      on ‘traditional’ mine action: While the involvement 
      of mine/ERW operators and UNMAS in new 
      programming areas is moving forward, national 
      mine action authorities have remained focused 
      for the most part on ‘traditional’ mine action. In 
     fact, in many mine/ERW affected countries, 
     parallel coordination structures exist for small 
      arms control, eg national SALW focal points or 
      commissions; they typically have limited contact 
      with their mine action counterparts. There are 
      few examples of national mine action authorities 
      engaging in SALW and munitions-specific pro-
      grammes. The Albanian Mine Action Executive 
      (AMAE) is among the exceptions. Following 
      the completion of the mine action programme in 
      Albania in 2009, AMAE used its mine action ex-
      perience and capacity to address the clearance 
      of unexploded ordnance (UXO) hotspot areas 
      across the country that resulted from past ex-
      plosions at ammunition depots or abandoned 
      army camps.36 Renamed the Albania Mine and 
      Munitions Coordination Office (AMMCO), it 
      is responsible for coordination, quality manage-
      ment, accreditation, community liaison and sur-
      vivor assistance, among other things. However, 
      AMAE made the shift only once the mine/ERW 
      threat had been fully resolved. If capacity and 
      resources are available, national mine action 
      programmes should not wait until after the com-
      pletion of their Article 5 clearance obligations to 
      facilitate the use of mine action organisations to 
      reduce armed violence. 
4.   Limited involvement in AVR-related policy 
     discussions at national level: Although mine/ 
      ERW operators are making progress in imple-
      menting field level programmes, contact with 
      national SALW, SSR and DDR actors on strategy
      and policy issues tends to be limited. In some 
      countries, operators are regarded by these actors
      largely as operational service providers. Although
     they have excelled at establishing effective 
     working relationships with security providers, 
      ie national militaries and the police, they gene-
      rally do not engage in broader policy discussion 
      and processes. Those involved in PSSM pro-
     grammes in particular tend to have limited
      contact with national SALW focal points and 
      civil society organisations involved in SALW 
      control and broader AVR issues. For example, 
      in Côte d’Ivoire, UNMAS and HALO Trust 
      support the DDR process organised by the 
      DDR division of the UN mission in Côte 
      d’Ivoire (UNOCI) and the National SALW 
      Commission by deploying technically qualified 
      staff to check weapons, inspect and identify
      ammunition prior to their registration by the 
      UNOCI-DDR team, and advise on the temporary
      storage of arms and ammunition. They do not 
MINE ACTION SUPPORT FOR ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION: 
MISSION CREEP OR RESPONDING TO WIDER SECURITY NEEDS?
10 |  16
MINE ACTION SUPPORT FOR ARMED VIOLENCE REDUCTION: 
MISSION CREEP OR RESPONDING TO WIDER SECURITY NEEDS?
11  |  16
      however engage in strategic discussions regarding
      the DDR process in Côte d’Ivoire. However, 
      there are exceptions; for example, in Libya, HI 
      is working with the Souk Al-Jouma Union of 
      NGOs and the Free Media Center, while in So-
      maliland, DDG works in partnership with local 
      peace building NGOs Haqsoor and Horn Peace.
5.   Efforts to mainstream gender are mixed: 
      Some operators have taken steps to mainstream 
      gender considerations into their new programmes. 
      For example, although DanChurchAid did not 
      have a formal gender mainstreaming policy in 
      place, its SALW Awareness Raising and Risk 
      Education project in Burundi ensured that 
      women were encouraged to participate as trainers 
      and SALW risk education focal points, and were 
      represented in media-related materials.37 HI 
      drew upon its organisational policy on gender, 
      as well as various in-house gender mainstreaming
      tools, for its SALW risk education project in 
      Libya. For example, HI works with local women’s 
      groups, and has adapted its RE methods to 
      reach out specifically to women, who are more 
      difficult to access in Libya. DDG does not have 
      a formal policy on gender but its Community 
      Safety Programme in Somaliland used several 
     approaches to take gender and diversity into 
     account. For example, DDG’s baseline surveys 
      collect sex and age disaggregated data, and both 
      male and female heads of household are inter-
      viewed. When DDG teams distribute safe storage
      devices to households to promote the safe storage 
      of SALW and prevent misuse, they typically target 
      men and boys who tend to be the main owners 
      of SALW. Women are encouraged to convince 
      their husbands to store their arms and ammuni-
      tion safely. It has however been more difficult 
      to mainstream gender considerations into pro-
      grammes that focus primarily on the instruments
      of violence, eg SALW and munitions destruction 
      and PSSM.
6.   As UNMAS and several mine action organisa-
      tions have ventured into the area of PSSM, the 
      following are some PSSM-specific reflections:
a.   PSSM has become a new domain for mine 
     action organisations: Several of the main NGO 
      operators38 are implementing PSSM programmes
      and, within the United Nations, UNMAS has 
      taken the lead on PSSM. PSSM has very clearly 
      become a new domain for mine action organisa-
      tions, and is highly competitive. Although ope-
      rators have not yet formed a global community 
      of practice to share information about program-
      ming approaches and lessons learnt, at field level 
      some have recognised that coordination is impor-
      tant, particularly when supporting the same
     national authorities and trying to ensure a 
      consistent approach.
b.   A holistic and sustainable approach to PSSM 
     is needed: PSSM programmes in conflict-affected
      or fragile contexts require a holistic and sustainable
      approach, which should involve a combination 
      of activities focused on strengthening the physical
      security of stores and depots, improving ammu-
      nition and weapons management, and developing 
      capacity of national security actors.
c.    Gaining access to information and physical 
     access to stores and depots can be difficult: 
      Operators implementing PSSM programmes 
      typically encounter challenges in getting accurate
      information about national stockpiles and gaining
      access to depots and armouries, given that this 
      is closely linked to national security. Access to 
      information and physical access to stores and 
      depots is particularly challenging in countries 
      that are just emerging from conflict, and where 
      there is a real fear of a return to conflict and, 
      therefore, a desire to maintain national stockpiles
      despite indications that munitions and arms may 
      be obsolete, degraded, dangerous and/or surplus 
     to requirements. Monitoring and assessing 
      stockpiles requires considerable trust on the part 
      of the national authorities, as knowledge of which
      weapons and munitions are stored where, and 
      their individual state, could be misused by foreign
      states or internal forces. Systems for storing 
      such information must therefore be secure, clearly
      understood by national authorities, and be based
      on clear agreements between operators and na-
      tional authorities on how that information can 
      be used. 
d.   Donors and operators tend to emphasise 
     achievement of outputs instead of outcomes: 
      Some donors seem to be more interested in 
      funding short term “quick win” and high visibility
      initiatives (eg destruction of MANPADS, SALW
      and munitions) rather than longer term support 
      to develop capacity, standards, monitoring, etc. 
      Few donors request that reporting for these AVR
      programmes be done in terms of outcomes, eg 
      improving public safety, reduced risk of harm to 
      civilians, reduced risk of SALW/munitions theft 
      and trafficking, etc. Results, particularly for the
      PSSM and munitions/SALW destruction pro-
      grammes, are largely measured in terms of outputs. 
      Organisations do not necessarily have the capa-
      city to report on how their PSSM programmes 
      contribute to AVR/public safety-related outcomes.
e.    Donor interest in ammunition management 
     capacity development is mixed: Donor interest 
      in strengthening the ammunition and weapons 
      management capacity of militaries in conflict-
      affected contexts is mixed. Some donors are 
      unaware of the potential risks posed by unsafe 
      ammunition management practice. Yet this pre-
      ventive work costs far less than responding to 
      an unplanned explosion at a munitions site.39 In 
      many cases, it may be that donors are aware of 
      the potential risk but the problem remains unad-
      dressed as their official aid agencies are not res-
      ponsible for such programmes and their Ministries
      of Defence are not involved in these countries.
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f.    Working with militaries can be challenging: Working with militaries 
      comes with its own set of challenges and opportunities. One challenge 
      several operators have encountered is that the decision-making process 
      is slow due to the command structure of militaries and the need to get 
      high-level approval for PSSM-related activities. This can result in delays 
      and slow the pace of the programme. 
g.   The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG)40 provide
     a sound basis for PSSM programmes: The IATG provide relevant
      information for PSSM programmes in a relatively accessible format.
      Although knowledge of the IATG is not essential for a typical mine action 
      programme, it is necessary for PSSM work. The IATG cover, in a com-
      prehensive manner, key topics such as ammunition and explosive storage 
      principles, transportation regulation, explosive safety regulation, quantity
      distance calculations, etc, and lay out the standards and materials required
      for the construction of ammunition stores and barracades. However,
      operators also recognise that PSSM advice and support needs to be 
      adapted to the local context and that a rigid application of European 
      standards is not always feasible.
h.   Opportunities exist to draw upon the Quality Management expertise 
     in mine action: In countries where operators are implementing PSSM 
      programmes, national standards and related accreditation and Quality 
      Management (QM) processes are not yet in place. As there is no clear 
      legal framework, the Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) used by 
      the operators to guide their PSSM operations are often the only reference
      documents. As external QM is not yet well developed, and the level of 
      internal QM varies, these initiatives could potentially benefit from the 
      QM experience and skills developed within the mine action sector. 
i.    Mine action organisations are engaging ammunition management
     experts for PSSM programmes: Mine action organisations that have 
      traditionally employed explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) qualified per-
      sonnel are also starting to engage individuals with ammunition management
     expertise, similar to the UK Ammunition Technical Officer (ATO) 
      qualification. Some have also employed advisors with construction or 
      civil engineering backgrounds to oversee the construction/rehabilitation 
      of storage facilities.
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CONCLUSIONS
Based on the findings of the GICHD study, it is clear that the role of mine
action organisations in supporting AVR is invaluable. While partly driven
by changes in funding and international political environments, their relevant
expertise, the innovative approaches that they are adopting (eg towards com-
munity safety), as well as the relationships they have already built with national
security sector actors give them unique insight, leverage and opportunity to
contribute to AVR.
Mine action organisations should continue to employ their expertise and ex-
perience to address wider security challenges. More, however, should be
done by national mine action programmes to explore opportunities to facili-
tate the entry of mine action organisations to support AVR, where capacity
and resources are available and the context appropriate. It is clear that efforts
to reduce armed violence require multi-faceted solutions and mine action or-
ganisations should continue to move towards programming that goes beyond
the instruments of armed violence. Some may argue that this shift towards
AVR is a diversion from the core mandate of mine action organisations.
While this may be true and different organisations may, quite reasonably,
choose differently whether to expand the scope of their operations, in many
contexts the threats to safety and security posed by arms are far higher than
threats from mines and ERW. Given that mine action organisations have ex-
pertise and experience which can be applied to prevent armed violence and
promote public safety, it is a natural and welcome shift for them to expand
their scope of activities into AVR programming.
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ANNEX 1 | SALW and AVR-related Agreements and Standards
Name Description
UN Firearms Protocol (2001/in force 2005) States required to secure and track firearms, their various components 
     and ammunition at the time of manufacture, import, export and transit.
UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat, State parties required to take steps to fight illicit SALW manufacturing 
and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and and trade in a broad range of areas, with follow-up meetings held bi-
Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (PoA) (2001) annually.
Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) Aimed at eliminating illicit trade and end use of conventional weapons, 
     but no agreement on treaty text has yet been reached.
International Small Arms Control Provides guidance (mainly for UN agencies supporting states in controlling
Standards (ISACS) (2012) SALW) on stockpile management, marking, record-keeping, tracing,  
     and destroying illicit or unwanted arms. 
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (2011) Provides guidance to states on establishing standards and procedures for 
     effective stockpile management. 
OSCE Handbook of Best Practices on Small Arms Provides guidance for states to implement the OSCE Document on SALW, 
and Light Weapons (2003) intended to minimise illegal SALW circulation.
OSCE Handbook of Best Practices Aims to guide policy-making of participating States on the destruction
on Conventional Ammunition (2008) of conventional ammunition, explosive material and detonation devices, 
     and stockpile management and control. 
GICHD Guide to Ammunition Storage (2008) Highlights good practices in the safe storage of ammunition.
Manual of NATO Safety Principles for the Storage Establishes safety principles to be used between host countries and NATO 
of Military Ammunition and Explosives (2010) forces in storing conventional ammunition and explosives.
Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Aimed at eradicating illicit manufacture and trade in SALW. Provisions
Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, include marking, record keeping, confiscation or forfeiture of firearms,
Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Material strengthening of controls at export points, and cooperation between
(CIFTA) (1997/in force 1998) member states.
Economic Community of West African States Signing parties must ensure safe management of national stockpiles, and
(ECOWAS) Convention (2006/in force 2009) dispose of excess or obsolete stocks.
Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control, Measures aimed at harmonising legislation between member states,
and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons strengthening law enforcement capacity, cross-border and regional
in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa cooperation, stockpile management, and sensitisation of populations 
(“Nairobi Protocol”) (2004/in force 2006) on the dangers of SALW.
Andean Community Decision 552: Andean Plan to Seeks to strengthen national capacity and regional cooperation in  
Prevent, Combat, and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small controlling the manufacture, trade, possession and use of SALW.
Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (2003)
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Declaration Member states commit to ensuring implementation of the Programme of 
on Small Arms and Light Weapons (2011) Action, strengthen security sectors, harmonise and strengthen legislation, 
      cooperate in stockpile management and destruction, and push for conclusion
     of a global Arms Trade Treaty.
Southern African Development Community (SADC) Measures aimed at eradicating illicit manufacture of SALW, regulating
Firearms Protocol (2001/in force 2004) trade of (legal) SALW, and harmonising legislation across member states.
EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (1998) Builds on the eight criteria adopted in 1991 for states to use in allowing 
     arms exports. Also includes reporting and consultation mechanisms to 
     ensure consistent interpretation of criteria.
EU Council Common Position (2008) Replaces and expands upon 1998 Code of Conduct. 
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